брифинг в пентагоне в понедельникQ: Yeah, could you talk a little bit more about what we're seeing in the east with regard to Russians sending more troops and other Wagner group or regular Russian troops? And also, are you seeing much armor coming with them? Are these more lightly armed troops?
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, thanks, Tom. So -- so what we've seen is Russia sending in replacements for units that have been, particularly in the Bakhmut area that have been -- had heavy casualties, but really, across the line attempting to send in some of those mobilized forces to help strengthen some of their defensive positions. Don't have anything to provide on the armor front. Again, a key aspect is despite these increased numbers in terms of replacements, reinforcements, not a significant enhancement in terms of the training of those forces. So again, ill-equipped, ill-trained, rushed to the battlefield, and something we'll obviously continue to keep an eye on. Thank you.
Q: But also replacements?
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yup.
Q: Were you talking hundreds, thousands? Can you give us a ballpark?
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: I would say across -- across the -- the forward line of troops, we're seeing thousands.
Q: Okay. And you can't characterize that in any way? More than five, fewer than 10, or anything?
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: I would say -- yeah, I would say, again, across the totality of the battlefield, probably tens of thousands at this point.
Q: Tens of --
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Again, not -- tens of thousands across the --
Q: Ten --
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Tens of thousands across the forward -- across the forward line of troops, and not coming in necessarily as organized units but -- but filling in the gaps where -- where replacements and reinforcements are needed.
- что вы видите на востоке в смысле шлют ли русские подкрепление, вагнеровцев? много ли оружия идёт вместе с ними или они легко вооружены?
- раша шлёт подкрепление частям, которые - особенно около Бахмута - сильно проредели, но в целом вдоль всей линии пытается присылать этих мобиков своих, чтобы укрепить позиции. Насчёт оружия мне нечего сказать. Но опять же главное, что, несмотря на то что растёт кол-во, качество не растёт. Плохо экипированные, плохо тренированные, тащут их на поле боя, и мы конечно продолжаем следить.
- но и замена?
- да
- какой порядок - сотни? тысячи?
- я б сказал, мы видим тысячи, вдоль всей линии
- больше пяти тысяч? меньше десяти?
- наверно десятки тысяч, по всей линии, но не обязательно прямо идут организованными частями, а скорее заплатки такие
Q: Thanks, (inaudible). A couple of questions. First, can you drill down a little bit more about the status in Kreminna? And then larger picture, does the U.S. share the German intelligence assessment that the Ukrainians are losing, you know, triple digits every day in Bakhmut? And then, you know, larger picture, should the Ukrainians lose the Donbas writ large, how or if would that affect their larger strategic objectives in this war?
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, thanks, Howard. On your last two questions, I'm going to be exceedingly disappointing, unfortunately, and then I'm not going to -- I'm not going to talk about hypotheticals about, you know, what could happen in the -- in those kinds of scenarios, nor am I going to talk about Ukrainian casualty figures.
And then in terms of Kreminna, what we're seeing is Ukrainian counter-offensive operations, again, largely fluid in that area, in terms of back and forth, making some incremental gains near Kreminna but, you know, that's about as detailed as I'm -- I'm able to get.
Again, stepping back, bigger picture, this is just one example of the Ukrainians looking to exploit opportunities along the -- the Russian defensive lines and our focus is on trying to get them the security assistance they need to be able to take advantage and exploit those kinds of opportunities. Thank you.
- Что происходит в Креминне? И ещё - согласны ли США с оценкой немецкой разведки, что украинцы теряют трёхзначные числа каждый лень в Бахмуте? Может украинцам пока стоит бросить Донбасс, как это отразилось бы на целях войны?
- Насчёт последних двух вопросов, я вас разочарую, я не собираюсь говорить про гипотетические сценарии, про потери украинцев тоже не буду.
Что касается Креминны, мы видим контрнаступательные операции, опять же, очень неровно там всё, туда-сюда, небольшой прирост около Креминны, но больше не могу сказать.
Большая картина это то, что это только один пример, как украинцы пытаются искать возможности вдоль рашистских линий обороны, и наша задача помогать им воспользоваться и не упустить эти возможности.
Q: Hey, thanks very much for doing this. Two questions. One, we've -- we've been told repeatedly that Russian forces are -- have been suffering from poor morale but to what extent is that poor morale actually impacting their ability to fight or -- or the overall support for Putin within Russia?
I remember a former Director of National Intelligence once said that the Russians have a great capacity to endure pain and suffering, and it seems like despite the poor morale, they keep throwing wave after wave of -- of poorly trained troops in -- troops in there.
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, thanks, Jeff. On the question of morale, just talking at the -- the macro level, you know, it -- it really comes down to combat effectiveness, readiness, and ability to achieve your tactical, operational, and strategic objectives, right?
So, you know, if -- if you think of any type of high performing team, when there's high morale, when there's -- properly equipped and properly led, you are going to accomplish what you've set out to accomplish. So morale can play a significant factor in terms of your ability to achieve your objectives.
And so in the case of Russian forces, this could manifest itself in -- in terms of what we've seen, which is instead of effective offensive operations, primarily defensive operations, trying to stem the tide and hold territory versus take territory, which clearly works to Ukraine's advantage. So I'll just kind of leave it -- leave it at that.
- нам постоянно говорят, что русские войска страдают от плохого морального духа, но что-то не видно, чем он им мешает, этот плохой дух, может, они всю жизнь привыкли жить с таким духом, он им как родной. Директор разведки тут делился, что русские привыкли страдать, и похоже этот плохой моральный дух не мешает подгонять новых дебилов с плохим духом.
- Да, Джеф, [
наверно они привыкли жить с плохим моральным духом, так и разве хорошо они живут? ну так же и воюют]
Это всё влияет на эффективность, готовность, возможности достичь военных целей. Представьте часть с хорошей производительностью, где хороший моральный дух, хорошо оснащённую, с умным лидером, она добивается, чего хочет. Это очень важно.
Ну и посмотрите на русских, вместо нападения сидят обороняются. Украине это помогает.
Q: It's been awhile, but thank you. Two questions. One, just following up on what you said about the counteroffensive in Kreminna. Can you just give us a little bit more information about the scope of how we should sort of look at this? I mean, it doesn't sound like this is a major counteroffensive that Ukraine is launching right now but more like incremental gains. So can you give us a little bit more information about that? And then I have a follow up.
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Well, we're -- you know, we're, again, not going to talk about future ops per say but largely from a strategic operational standpoint as I mentioned largely around the frontline right now it's static, right? So -- but that doesn't mean that there's nothing happening.
You've got Russia, again, trying to push near Bakhmut. You've got Ukraine pushing near Kreminna, but the capabilities that we're providing that I highlighted at the top, these types of armored and maneuver capabilities as well as the artillery capabilities, the fires capabilities are designed to be able to change the equation on the battlefield and give Ukraine the capability that they need -- when I say capability, that's equipment plus training -- that they need to be able to not only defend their territory but also conduct their counteroffensive to take back territory that has been occupied by Russia.
So again, they'll make the decision in terms of when they will start those large-scale operations to do that. And our focus is on enabling them and getting them ready to succeed when they do.
- Насчёт контрнаступления в Креминне. Какой там масштаб, как нам это расценивать? Не похоже на огромное контрнаступление, какой-то небольшой прирост. Расскажите поподробнее.
- я не хочу подробнее, в целом линия фронта как будто статичная, но это не значит, что там ничего не происходит.
Раша пытается давить под Бахмутом, а украинцы начали под Креминной. Но новое оружие которое мы им собираемся подогнать, оно всё может помочь изменить соотношение сил, дать украинцам то, что им нужно, чтобы не только обороняться, но начать контрнаступление.
Q: So then, have the Bradleys actually arrived that -- arrived yet? And then just quickly on the Abrams as well, the DOD officials keep sort of saying how these are not the right weapons for the European battlefield right now, but I guess the kind of obvious follow up then is why are they in the U.S. arsenal? So can you maybe give like a defense I suppose of the counterargument to what you've been saying about Abrams?
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yes. So on the Bradleys, no. They have not arrived yet. Again, we won't pre-announce, you know, when they specifically get there. We'll let the Ukrainians do that. You know, we're talking weeks, not months, so you know, in the relatively near future.
On the Abrams, again, our focus has been on providing capabilities to the Ukrainians that they can use right now, right, that are going to have a -- that are going to have an impact. The M1 is an extremely capable and effective fighting system, but it's also a very complex system that requires a lot of maintenance, requires a lot of logistic support.
And so, again, when you look at the kinds of armored and fires capabilities that are in the PDA that we just announced and the one prior to that, these are all things that can be employed immediately on the battlefield to help change that equation.
When it comes to the capabilities that the M1 provides to the United States military, again, we're kind of comparing two different things here, right? The Ukrainian Armed Forces are highly effective, but it's not the United States military that has global commitments and multiple countries and obviously larger.
So in the same way that we had advanced air capabilities like the F-35 or advanced sea capabilities, the M1 is an advanced armor capability employed by U.S. forces to meet our global national security commitments. Thank you.
- эти брэдли - они уже прибыли? и про абрамсы ещё, официальные лица без устали говорят, что эти абрамсы прям некудышнее оружие для европы, ваще не нужны украинцам - зачем тогда они нашей армии?
- брэдли - нет, пока нет. И мы не будем сообщать, когда прибудут, пусть украинцы сами сообщают по факту. Но это недели, не месяцы, это в ближайшем будущем.
Насчёт абрамсов, у нас просто фокус на том, чтоб дать украинцам то, что они могут поскорее использовать. М1 - офигительно эффективная система, но очень сложная в обслуживании.
Поэтому хочется прислать чо-то попроще, чтобы быстрее использовать.
Для нашей армии М1 прекрасно подходят. Украинская армия конечно хорошая, но наша-то ещё больше и нам надо.
У нашей армии всё продвинутое, и F-35, и М1, потому что мы дико могучи и у нас полно дел по всему миру.
