Ней просрав всі полімери, що там ще могло бути.
Most historians remember Ney of course for the disastrous cavalry charge on Wellington’s center. The order to charge, 10,000 strong, across a mile of muddy terrain, up a slope and into Allied infantry squares, all without infantry or artillery support, was a disaster equal to any ever committed in the Napoleonic Wars.
And nobody really knows why. Historians figure it's because Ney thought the Allies were retreating, but really, having fought Wellington before, he should have known of reverse slope tactics and Wellington's tendency to hide his troops.
Ney also seemingly forgot to spike the English batteries, which of course had disastrous consequences for the Old Guard and final French attack.
This mistake however, does not compare to Ney's hesitation at Quatre-Bras. Because Ney hesitated to take the unguarded crossroads, and was repulsed by a lonely Dutch picquet brigade (are you kidding me!), Wellington was able to assemble his forces in time and thereby divert additional French reinforcements to Quatre-Bras, which should have been used instead at Ligny.If D'Erlon for instance, falls on the Prussian flank at Ligny instead of leaving to assist Ney, it's possible the Prussian army could have been destroyed, or at least beaten enough to no longer be a factor.
Napoleon had the right idea, when facing two enemies, to divide and conqueror. Unfortunately though, it looks like he didn't get much help from Ney or anybody else. And though Napoleon does deserve blame for not conforming to the ideas of unity of command, Ney actions (as bravest of the brave) were certainly foolish and mostly inexcusable.
більш детально про виділене
To contest the crossroads at Quatre-Bras, Napoleon dispatched a holding force under Marshal Michel Ney, a commander whom Napoleon had dubbed “the bravest of the brave” for his conduct during the retreat from Russia. Ney advanced cautiously on the allied position, however, allowing Wellington the opportunity to reinforce his outnumbered troops, and the allies retained Quatre-Bras after a day of inconclusive fighting.
Drouet’s corps was attached to Ney’s command, however, and a series of conflicting orders from Ney and Napoleon led to Drouet’s spending June 16 pointlessly marching and countermarching between the two battlefields. Blücher’s troops fought stubbornly, but they lacked the skill and stamina of the French veterans, and by late afternoon Napoleon was ready to administer a finishing blow to the Prussian centre, pending the arrival of Drouet’s corps. At that moment a strong enemy column was reported in the French rear, and sections of the French left wing began to withdraw in the face of that apparent threat. Blücher took advantage of the confusion by launching a heavy attack, but it was rebuffed by a detachment of Napoleon’s veteran Imperial Guard. The turning point of the battle had now been reached: Blücher’s troops had spent their force, and Napoleon had confirmed that the mysterious enemy column was, in fact, Drouet’s, and it had already begun to withdraw in accordance with orders from Ney.
